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DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE
INDEPENDENT SECTOR
Dana Brakman Reiser*
INTRODUCTION

In the for-profit sector, solid corporate governance has come to be
marked by the existence of independent directors. 1 Corporate boards are
urged, if not mandated, to compose themselves with a majority of
independent directors. 2 Further, these independent directors should be used
to staff committees with important monitoring and gatekeeping roles. In
particular, independent directors should make up the ranks of audit, 3
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. University of
Pennsylvania. I am indebted to the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Program and
the able research assistance of Aaron Oberg, Rachel Pearlman, and Rebecca Sendker. I
greatly appreciate the comments and suggestions of Evelyn Brody, Marion Fremont-Smith,
Claire Kelly, Jeff Reiser, and David Reiss. I am also grateful for the feedback I received
from the other participants and attendees at the Symposium Nonprofit Law, Economic
Challenges, and the Future of Charities,sponsored by Fordham Law School and the Lincoln
Center for the Performing Arts, Inc. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1. See Bus. Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance 14 (2005), available at
http://64.203.97.43/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf (stating that public corporations should
have substantial independent majorities because "[p]roviding objective independent
judgment is at the core of the board's oversight function"); Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys.,
Core Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance 8 (2007), available at
http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgovprinciples.pdf (describing independence as "the cornerstone of accountability"); TIAACREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance 7 (2007), available at
http://www.tiaacref.org/pubs/pdf/governance-policy.pdf ("Director independence is a
principle long advocated by TIAA-CREF that is now widely accepted as the keystone of
good corporate governance."); E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial
Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 Bus. Law. 681, 687 (1998) ("Perhaps the most
effective stockholder protection device is the independence of directors.").
2. See,
e.g.,
Am.
Stock
Exch.,
Company
Guide
§
802(a),
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chpI1-8&man
ual=/AMEX/CompanyGuide/amex-company-guide/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); NASDAQ,
Marketplace
Rule
4350(c),
http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1 705&elementid= 1014 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007) (similarly requiring an independent board majority); NYSE Euronext,
Listed
Company
Manual
§
303A.01,
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/ 1I
82508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcmsection.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007)
(requiring "a majority of independent directors").
3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3) (Supp. IV 2004)
(requiring independence for all members of audit committees of issuers under the Securities
Exchange Act); Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
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Independent director
compensation, 4 and nominating committees. 5
requirements have been widely adopted by regulators, self-regulating
organizations, and individual corporations as a primary method for
preventing failures due to malfeasance or negligence of corporate decisionmakers. 6 While only the future can determine whether independent director
reforms will be successful in reforming the companies they target, the
success of these reforms in being adopted cannot be questioned.
With this dynamic established, it is not hard to imagine state or federal
regulators applying the independent director concept to cure perceived
accountability and other failures in nonprofit organizations. Indeed, a few
such calls have already been made. Federal proposals to improve nonprofit
governance floated in recent years would require nonprofit boards to
contain independent majorities. 7 This concept is not entirely novel, as
independence requirements have been on the books in a few states for
several years. 8 Further, legislation recently passed to improve nonprofit
C.F.R. § 240.1OA-3(b) (2006) (requiring exchanges to adopt listing standards mandating
audit committee independence); Am. Stock Exch., supra note 2, § 803(a) (requiring listed
companies to have wholly independent audit committees); NASDAQ, supra note 2, at
4350(d)(2) (similar); NYSE Euronext, supra note 2, § 303A.06-07 (similar).
4. See Am. Stock Exch., supra note 2, § 805 (requiring an optional compensation
committee to be independent; otherwise, compensation is determined by "a majority of the
independent directors"); NASDAQ, supra note 2, at 4350(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (requiring chief
executive officer compensation to be determined by "a majority of the independent directors,
or... a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors"); NYSE
Euronext, supra note 2, § 303A.05 (requiring entire compensation committee to be
independent).
5. See Am. Stock Exch., supra note 2, § 804 (generally requiring director nominations
to be made "by either a Nominating Committee comprised solely of independent directors or
by a majority of the independent directors"); NASDAQ, supra note 2, at 4350(c)(4)
(requiring nomination of directors by either a wholly independent committee or "a majority
of the independent directors"); NYSE Euronext, supra note 2, § 303A.04 (requiring
"nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent directors");
see also NASDAQ, IM-4350-4 Board Independence and Independent Committees,
http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid= 1705&elementid= 1019 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007) (offering additional guidance on independent board composition and
committee credentialing requirements).
6. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., supra note 1, at 8 (recommending majority
independent boards and encouraging "substantial majorit[ies] of independent directors" (footnote
omitted)); Council of Inst. Investors, Corporate Governance Policies 2 (2007), available at
http://www.cii.org/policies/Current/ 2OCII%20Corporate%20Governance%2OPolicies%200320-07.pdf; TIAA-CREF, supra note 1, at 7-8, 12-16 (promulgating policy that substantial board
majorities should be independent, and audit, compensation, and nominating committees should be
composed of independent directors); Gen. Motors Corp., Bylaws arts. 2.11, 3.2, 3.4-.8 (2007),
available at
http://www.gm.com/corporate/investor-information/docs/corp-gov/bylaws.pdf
(requiring a majority of independent directors for the board and requiring independent directors to
compose investment funds, audit, executive compensation, public policy, and corporate
governance committees); supra notes 2-5; see also GM Board of Dirs., Corporate
Governance
Guidelines
(Index)
4
(2007),
available
at
http://www.gm.com/corporate/investor-information/docs/corp-gov/cg-guidelines.pdf
(discussing, in a set of governance guidelines, the need for a "substantial majority of independent
Directors").
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.A.
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accountability in California mandates that independent directors staff audit
committees, and legislative proposals in other states have included similar
requirements. 9
With the persistent focus on nonprofit governance,
independence requirements will no doubt continue to be proposed and
considered.
The adaptation of independent director reforms to the nonprofit sector,
however, raises important questions regarding the useful meaning of
"independence" in the context of nonprofit directors. Independent director
reforms in the for-profit sector seek to counterbalance many concerns,
including financial integrity, failures of objectivity, and domination. Each
of these concerns arise in the nonprofit sphere, but they have somewhat
different dimensions there than in its for-profit counterpart. Moreover, even
if the concerns were precisely the same, it is unclear how to define
independence in a nonprofit-an organization with multiple legitimate
stakeholders, none having comprehensive primacy. 10
This essay explores how a notion of independence would deal with these
concerns in the particular context of nonprofit corporations. 1 Part I begins
by describing in more detail the independence requirements mentioned
above. With the objects of the analysis thus set, Part II examines the core
purposes of independence requirements and considers the extent to which
these concerns are important in nonprofit governance.
Finding they are important, Part III then moves to the crucial definitional
question: how can a notion of an independent nonprofit director be given
meaningful content? This part reviews six types of relationships that might
be addressed in crafting a definition of independence for nonprofit
directors. Its analysis demonstrates that each of these relationships presents
a dilemma for nonprofit governance reformers. Defining independence to
exclude each of these relationships would seem to serve the more specific
goals of independence requirements. Yet, often, doing so also could
hamper the broader goals of improving nonprofit governance and
strengthening the nonprofit sector. With these issues thus delineated, Part
IV offers advice on crafting limited independent director requirements as

9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations 141 (3d ed.

2006) (stating that nonprofit directors "must be responsive to several constituencies: the one
that elected or appointed them, the constituency the organization serves, and the constituency
of legal accountability" (citing ABA Section of Bus. Law, Guidebook for Directors of
Nonprofit Corporations 8-10 (George W. Overton & Jeannie Carmadelle Frey eds., 2d ed.
2002))); Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in The State of Nonprofit America
471, 472 (Lester Salamon ed., 2002) (noting the challenge of accountability in nonprofits,
which depends on "trust involv[ing] multiple-sometimes conflicting-demands from a
variety of stakeholders").

11. Although a nonprofit organization may take the legal form of a charitable trust or an
unincorporated association, most U.S. nonprofits are formed as nonprofit corporations. See
Marilyn E. Phelan, Nonprofit Enterprises: Corporations, Trusts, and Associations § 1:03

(2000). Independence requirements, and this essay, are addressed only to nonprofits legally
constructed as corporations.
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part of an array of reforms that might advance nonprofit governance, and
Part V briefly concludes.
I. PROPOSED INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR REFORMS

A diverse group of nonprofit independent director requirements are
currently in force, more are under consideration, and still more might be
reasonably contemplated. This part divides this universe of potential
reforms into two categories: board composition rules, which demand that a
certain percentage of a nonprofit's board members qualify as independent,
and committee credentialing requirements, which mandate independent
credentials for some or all members of key nonprofit board committees. In
explaining these categories, it also introduces the principal jurisdictions,
regulators, and self-regulatory bodies that have adopted and advocated such
reforms.
A. Board Composition Rules
Board composition rules require that a percentage (typically a majority)
of nonprofit boards be comprised of independent directors. These rules are
not entirely unique to the current post-Sarbanes-Oxley nonprofit reform
environment. Independent majority requirements have been in existence in
a handful of states for several years 12 and in California since 1980.13 An
optional provision in the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
required that public benefit nonprofits compose their boards with no more
14
than forty-nine percent of members being "financially interested."'
Indeed, language from this optional provision appears to have been used to
form the board composition requirements in Maine, North Dakota, and

12. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(2) (2005) (adopted 2001, effective
2003) (limiting "financially interested persons" to forty-nine percent of the board of a public
benefit corporation); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:6-a (1999) (adopted and effective 1996)
(mandating that the boards of each charitable nonprofit must "have at least 5 voting
members, who are not of the same immediate family or related by blood or marriage"); N.D.
Cent. Code § 10-33-27(2) (2005) (adopted and effective 1997) (limiting "financially
interested individuals" to forty-nine percent of the board); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 B, § 8.13(a)
(1997) (providing that "no more than 49 percent of the individuals serving on the board of
any public benefit corporation may be financially interested persons").
13. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5227(a) (West 2006) (adopted 1978, effective 1980) (limiting
"interested persons" to forty-nine percent of the board of a public benefit corporation).
14. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 (1987). Interest in such a provision,
however, was always lukewarm and may now be completely absent. A comment to the
optional section stated the worries of "many members" of the drafting committee, including
that "[l]egitimate public benefit corporations might have difficulty in finding active and
competent directors who had no financial interest in the corporation." Id. § 8.13 official cmt.
The current drafting process to revise the Act includes no language on independent board
composition-whether mandatory or optional. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act ch. 8
(Exposure Draft 2007) (on file with author) (including no such section).
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Vermont. 15 Yet to date there has not been widespread adoption of these
requirements at the state level.
In the current thrust for more accountability from nonprofit directors,
board composition proposals have resurfaced-particularly on the federal
level. The initial proposals by the Senate Finance Committee staff in its
16
June 2004 Discussion Draft addressed independence on several levels.
One proposal would have permitted nonprofits to have only a single board
member who is compensated by the nonprofit and could not serve as board
chair or treasurer. 17 Another would have required public charities to have
at least twenty percent of their directors be independent, with a minimum of
one member, and contemplated higher independence minima in certain
circumstances. 18 "An independent member would be defined as free of any
relationship with the corporation or its management that may impair or
appear to impair the director's ability to make independent judgments."', 9
Although the board composition requirement advocated by the
Discussion Draft has not yet been adopted, the federal Pension Reform Act
of 2006 did require tax-exempt credit counseling agencies to establish
"non-financially interested" board contingents. 20 Its mandate operates on
two tiers:
[N]ot more than 20 percent of the voting power... [may be] vested in
persons who are employed by the organization or who will benefit
financially, directly or indirectly, from the organization's activities (other
15. Compare Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 (1987), with Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(2), N.D. Cent. Code § 10-33-27(2), and Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 IB, §
8.13(a). The California requirement uses similar language, but predates the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA). As the California nonprofit corporation statute was
the source of some of the RMNCA's core content, perhaps the RMNCA requirement was
derived from California's preexisting language. See Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon
Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations-The
American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit CorporationAct, 39 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 751, 758 (1989) (describing the California nonprofit corporation statute as serving as "a
beta site for the American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Act").
16. See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., Staff Discussion Draft 13 (2004), available
at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf.
This Discussion
Draft consisted of nineteen pages of proposed reforms to improve the governance and
functioning of tax-exempt nonprofits and touched off a firestorm of hearings, reform
proposals, and the convening of the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector. See Charity Oversight
and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financeof the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Charity
Oversight and Reform]; Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the S. Fin. Comm., &
Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman and Ranking Member of the S. Fin. Comm., to Diana Aviv,
President
and
CEO
of Indep.
Sector
(Sept.
22,
2004),
available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/SFCltr.pdf. For more information on the Nonprofit
Panel, see infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
17. See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., supra note 16, at 13. A recent report
recommending governance changes at the American Red Cross advocates adoption of a similar
standard. See Am. Red Cross Bd. of Governors, American Red Cross: Governance for the 21st
Century 55 (2006), availableat http://www.redcross.org/static/file cont5765_lang0_2202.pdf.
18. See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., supra note 16, at 13.
19. Id.
20. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 1220(a), I.R.C. 501(q)(1)(D) (West 2007).
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than through the receipt of reasonable directors' fees or the repayment of
consumer debt to creditors other than the credit counseling organization
or its affiliates), and
... not more than 49 percent of the voting power of which [may be]
vested in persons who are employed by the organization or who will
benefit financially, directly or indirectly, from the organization's
activities
21
(other than through the receipt of reasonable directors' fees).
The credit counseling industry has been under recent scrutiny by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) due to concerns about self-dealing and other
abuse issues, 2 2 and the new governance rules mandated for them appear to
indicate the direction at least some legislators would like to pursue for more
general tax-exempt governance reform. 23 Other federal agencies and
programs likewise have proposed or adopted board composition rules

emphasizing

independent

majorities,

including

proposed

governance

standards for entities participating in the AbilityOne program 24 and the

Department of the Treasury's anti-terror financing guidelines. 25 Although

21. Id. § 1220(a), I.R.C. 501(q)(1)(D)(ii)-(iii) (West 2007).
22. See IRS, Credit Counseling Compliance Project (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cereport.pdf; IRS, Executive Summary, Credit Counseling
Compliance
Project
(2006),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/cc executive summary.pdf; see also Jennifer Bayot, Senate Panel Seeks to Hasten
Inquiries of Credit Counselors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2004, at C2 (reporting the Senate
Finance Committee's interest in the area); IRS Ends Exempt Status for Some Credit
Counselors, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2006, at C6 (describing the results of this scrutiny).
23. See J. Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The "Pension
Protection Act of 2006," as Passed by the House on July 28, 2006, and as Considered by the
Senate on August 3, 2006, at 318 n.435 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/x38-06.pdf (noting that inclusion of provisions addressing governance of credit counseling
agencies, including the independent board provision, "affirms the importance of these core
issues to the matter of tax exemption, both to credit counseling organizations and to other
types of exempt organizations").
24. See Comm. for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled:
Nonprofit Agency Governance and Executive Compensation, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,721, 74,722
(Dec. 16, 2005) (codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 51-2, 51-3, 51-4) (identifying boards with "no
fewer than five unrelated directors" as a best practice and suggesting that it may adopt this
practice as a requirement for its participating nonprofit agencies). AbilityOne, formerly
known as the Javits-Wagner-O'Day program, provides opportunities for the blind and
disabled to work in industry, manufacturing products for use by the federal government. See
Comm. for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, About Us,
http://www.abilityone.gov/jwod/about-us/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
25. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Anti-terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best
Practices
for
U.S.-Based
Charities
4-5
(2006),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/officeslenforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs/guidelines- charities.pdf
(emphasizing the importance of independent oversight for charities, and noting that board
members "ordinarily should not have an active role in the day-to-day management of the
charitable organization"). Interestingly, although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
recently seen fit to offer its pronouncements on "good governance practices" for
organizations that receive tax-exemption under I.R.C. § 50 1(c)(3), its recommendations for
boards do not address independence. See IRS, Draft: Good Governance Practices for
501(c)(3)
Organizations
(n.d.),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/good-govemance-practices.pdf.
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not imposing a board composition requirement, the newly revised draft of
the Form 990, the main informational return filed by tax-exempt nonprofits,
twice asks each reporting entity to disclose the number of independent
members of its governing body. 26 As such, independent board composition
appears to have continuing salience for federal legislators and regulators.
Self-regulation proponents also have seized on board composition
requirements as key to improving nonprofit governance. The release of the
Senate Finance Committee's Staff Discussion Draft was followed by a
series of hearings and other meetings on reforming federal law relating to
nonprofits. 27 Shortly after these events, the committee's chairman and
ranking member asked Independent Sector "to convene an independent
national panel on the non-profit sector to consider and recommend actions
that will strengthen good governance, ethical conduct and effective practice
of public charities and private foundations. '2 8
Independent Sector
complied by establishing the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, which over the
next eighteen months released a series of reports recommending governance
and other reforms for tax-exempt nonprofits. 29 The Nonprofit Panel's final
26. I.R.S. Draft Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No.
1545-0047) pt. I questions 3 & 4, pt. II questions la & lb (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/form990coreform.pdf.
The proposed glossary of terms
defines "independent member of a governing body" as
[a] person: [w]ho is not compensated as an employee of the organization; [w]ho
does not receive compensation or other payments from the organization as an
independent contractor (other than reimbursement of expenses or reasonable
compensation for services provided in the capacity of serving as a member of the
governing body); [w]ho does not receive, directly or indirectly, material financial
benefits from the organization except, if applicable, as a member of the charitable
class served by the organization; and [w]ho is not a spouse, sibling, parent, or child
of any individual who is employed by, or receives compensation or other material
benefits from, the organization.
IRS, Tax-Exempt & Government Entities Div., Office of Exempt Orgs., Draft Form 990
Redesign-Glossary 6 (2007) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/draftform990redesignglossary.pdf (citing Treas. Reg. 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii) (2006))
(noting that the definition was adapted from the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector Revised
Principles-Draft for Public Comment 13 (n.d)). Although the IRS has announced it will
further revise the current draft, it has reiterated its commitment to retaining governance
questions on the new Form 990. See Grant Williams, Governance Is Key Issue in Regulating
Charities, IRS Official Tells State Leaders, Chron. of Philanthropy, Oct. 16, 2007,
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/3255/govemance-is-key-issue-in-regulating-charitiesirs-official-tells-state-leaders.
27. See supra note 16.
28. Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley & Sen. Max Baucus, supra note 16.
29. See Letter from Diana Aviv, President and CEO of Indep. Sector, to Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Chairman of the S. Fin. Comm., & Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman and Ranking Member
of the S. Fin. Comm. (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/acceptance-html.html;
see also Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Interim Report Presented to the Senate Finance
Committee (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf,
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and Accountability
of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2005)
[hereinafter
Panel
on
the Nonprofit
Sector,
Final
Report],
available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel-Final-Report.pdf; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
Strengthening Transparency Governance Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A
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report included a recommendation that Congress should direct amendments
to treasury regulations to require at least one-third of the members of boards
of tax-exempt public charities to be independent. 30 The definition of
independence the Nonprofit Panel employed would deem independent
individuals (1) who have not been compensated by the organization
within the past twelve months, including full-time and part-time
compensation as an employee or as an independent contractor, except for
reasonable compensation for board service; (2) whose own compensation,
except for board service, is not determined by individuals who are
compensated by the organization; (3) who do not receive, directly or
indirectly, material financial benefits (i.e., service contracts, grants, or
other payments) from the organization except as a member of the
charitable class served by the organization; and (4) who are not related
to
31
(as a spouse, sibling, parent, or child) any individual described above.
In addition to its recommendations to Congress, the Nonprofit Panel created
an advisory committee to study self-regulation and released a report of the
Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice in October 2007.32
These Principles also prominently include a commitment to independent
33
boards, recommending a supermajority in most cases.
Support for independence requirements can also be found in the
American Law Institute's draft Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations.
Although it eschews a broad-reaching concept of
independence for nonprofit directors, 34 the draft encourages board
majorities that are separate from management. Directors composing this
majority would not be "compensated by or otherwise obtain[] a direct
financial benefit from the charity other than as... board member[s]. ' '35 In
Supplement to the Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2006), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/supplement/Panel-SupplementFinal.pdf.
In addition to
offering downloads of its three major reports, the Nonprofit Panel describes much of its
work on its web site, www.nonprofitpanel.org.
30. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 75.
31. Id.
32. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Principles for Good Governance and Effective
Practice:
A Guide for Charities and Foundations (2007), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/selfreg/Principles-Guide.pdf. For a critique of earlier drafts
of the Principles, including criticism of the lack of definition of "self-regulation" and their
one-size-fits-all approach, see Adam Meyerson, The Philanthropy Roundtable, An Open

Letter to Independent Sector on Its Draft Principles of Self-Regulation (2007), available at
http://www.acreform.com/legislative/2007/comments/documents/an-open-letter.pdf.
33. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 32, at 15 (recommending that a
"substantial majority of the board of a public charity .. .should be independent" and
defining "substantial" generally to mean at least two-thirds).
34. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 31 0(c)(2), at 66 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007) (explaining that a concept of "external board-member independence-is not
required and indeed might constitute lack of accountability to key constituents of the
charity"); see also Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through

the Gaps Between Law and Practice,76 Fordham L. Rev. 521, 525-26 (2007). In her essay,
Professor Evelyn Brody, reporter for the ALI project, expands on this issue. Id.
35. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310(c)(3), at 67 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
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sum, board composition requirements have become a mainstay of private
recommendations on best practices for nonprofit organizational governance.
B. Committee CredentialingRequirements
In addition to proposals demanding or recommending independent board
majorities, proposals have been raised to address the independent
credentials of nonprofit board committee members. These proposals
typically speak to audit committees, and require them to be staffed by
independent directors. 36 The California Nonprofit Integrity Act, 37 adopted
in 2004, requires nonprofit corporations that receive $2 million or more in
annual gross revenues to prepare annual, independently audited, financial
statements and to establish audit committees to review and oversee the audit
process. 38 Audit committee members are subject to various credentialing
requirements; although they need not be board members, they may not be
staff members, may not receive any compensation from the organization
(other than for board service generally), and may not have "a material
financial interest in an entity doing business with" the organization. 39 A
recent Hawaii proposal includes similar audit committee independence
requirements, 40 as did some versions of nonprofit governance reform
42
proposals put forward in New York41 and Massachusetts.

36. See Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiquesof Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation
of Nonprofit Governance, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 765, 771-73 (2007). Professor Aprill
describes and critiques the fact that "[n]onprofit adaptations of [Sarbanes-Oxley's] audit
committee requirements . . . largely accept the independence mandate." Id. at 771.
Advocates and individual organizations have also suggested staffing compensation and
nominating committees solely with independent directors. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on
Nonprofit Governance, Guide to Nonprofit Corporate Governance in the Wake of SarbanesOxley 34-37 (2005) (advocating that nonprofit compensation and nominating committees
should be staffed entirely by independent directors); Judith A. Cion, The Role of the
Nominating or Governance Committee of a Nonprofit, in Nonprofit Governance and
Management 179, 180 (Victor Futter et al. eds., 2002) ("The nonprofit nominating
committee, like a corporate nominating committee, should consist entirely of outside
directors."); see also Am. Red Cross Bd. of Governors, supra note 17, at 61, 86
(recommending all-independent nominating and compensation committees for the American
Red Cross and citing these sources in support of the former recommendation).
37. Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919 (as signed by governor Sept. 29,
2004),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_12511300/sb_1262_bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf.
38. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005).
39. Id. The statute also places limitations on overlap of membership among audit and
finance committees. See id.
40. S.B. 73, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2007) (requiring an independent audit
committee in those nonprofit corporations required to file audits with the state and in those
of a certain financial size).
41. See N.Y. Legislative Bill Drafting Comm'n, Program Bill No. 68-05 § 3 (2005)
(amending N.Y. Not-for-Profit
Corp. Law
§ 712(g)(3)(B)), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char pdf/ag68-05.pdf (mandating
that
nonprofit
corporations who have financial statements audited by a public accountant and those of a
certain financial magnitude establish audit committees, each member of which must have
independent credentials).

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76

The Nonprofit Panel's Principles for Good Governance and Ethical
Practice also recommend that nonprofit boards consider independence
requirements for audit committee members. 43 This suggestion appears in
the Nonprofit Panel's rationale for its principle on financial record keeping,
review and auditing, and notes the value of an independent audit committee
in "reducing possible conflicts." 44 As nonbinding "principles" for "good
governance and ethical practice," these proposals are not intended to be
adopted as government mandates. 45 However, they demonstrate the broad
appeal of independence requirements to those seeking to improve nonprofit
governance, whether by government regulation or sector-initiated
recommendations of best practices.
Credentialing rules requiring independent audit committees obviously
have more limited scope than general board composition requirements, but
they nonetheless raise important practical and theoretical issues. Staffing
the audit committees of nonprofits is often quite challenging, as their role
can be difficult. 46 Volunteers without relevant financial experience 47 may

42. See Press Release, Office of Mass. Att'y Gen. Tom Reilly, AG Reilly Introduces
Charities Legislation to Promote Financial Discipline, Protect Against Mismanagement
available
at
§
3
(May
1,
2005),
and
Overcompensation
a
CharitiesAct 6-06.pdf (proposing
http://www.nerche.org/Reilly-Press-Release
statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 80, to require public charities of a certain financial
magnitude to establish an audit committee of independent members).
43. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 32, at 20 (recommending such
organizations "should consider establishing an audit committee composed of independent
board members with appropriate financial expertise").
44. See id. The Senate Finance Committee Staff Discussion Draft did not address audit
committee credentials, but indicated that audit review should be performed by the entire
board. Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., supra note 16, at 11-12. The independent board
composition rules discussed earlier, supra text accompanying notes 27-33, would thus apply
to these individuals.
45. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra. note 32, at 2-6; see also Diana Aviv,
Shared Principles: Drafting Standardsfor Ethical,Effective Management, Nonprofit Times,
Mar. 15, 2007, at 12 (describing the idea behind the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector's
principles of effective practice as a complement to improved government regulation and
enforcement).
46. See Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1303, 1316
(addressing "the difficulty many nonprofits encounter when searching for qualified directors
and board members").
47. Another related, but distinct, reform idea has been to propose that audit committee or
board members should be financially literate. See, e.g., S.B. 73, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 2
(Haw. 2007), available at http://capitol.hawaii.gov/sessioncurrent/bills/SB73_.htm
(proposing a statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414(D)(d), to require at least one audit committee
member to have financial experience sufficient to evaluate the organization's financial
statements and the competency of auditors); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report,
supra note 29, at 79 (explaining that charitable organizations should have board members
with financial literacy in order to be able to perform audit oversight, or should establish a
non-board, non-staff audit committee to assist the board in this role). This issue is, of
course, linked to concerns about job performance by these fiduciaries and thus has some
policy content in common with the independence requirements addressed by this essay.
Still, the proposals are distinct and the balance of the essay will put financial literacy
proposals aside.
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shy away from mastering the complexities of monitoring an audit, favoring
other committee assignments. 48 Some of those with relevant financial
expertise may be unwilling to serve because they would like to leave their
work at work. Others will be unable to serve, at least as independent audit
committee members, due to a professional relationship with the nonprofit.
Those candidates remaining will be in ever shorter supply. 49 Thus, the
practical impact of adding an independence requirement for audit
committee members may be to increase the difficulty of filling these
important positions.
Committee credentialing requirements demanding independence also
expose the theory that stands behind the independent director idea and ideal.
Independent audit committee requirements reveal the concern that
"independent" eyes, ears, and voices are needed in order to appropriately
vet the financial operations of nonprofits, as a key to avoiding misconduct
and scandal. For this reason, these requirements have been an integral part
of the general advocacy around requiring nonprofit audits and audit
committees. 50 These reforms embrace the idea that independent credentials
audit committee members are central to a functioning audit
for nonprofit
5
process. '
Although board composition and committee credentialing requirements
are distinct types of reforms, the balance of this essay will consider them
together. Both reform categories stem from a belief that independence will
allow directors and committee members to perform similar functions. Both
rely upon independence as a proxy for other, more difficult to measure,
qualities that will benefit nonprofit boards or committees. And, both are in
play-separately and together-as important ideas in the current discussion
on reforming nonprofit governance. The next part will consider why
independence is viewed as likely to enhance fiduciaries' ability to pursue
their important roles.
II. THE PURPOSES OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS

To understand how independence reforms might perform in the nonprofit
sector, it is best to start by considering the impetus behind independence
48. See Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1981, 2008-09 (2007)

(discussing the unique challenges posed to directors asked to comprehend nonprofit
accounting); Szymanski, supra note 46, at 1316 (noting the increasing difficulty of the tasks
of nonprofit directors).
49. Cf Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence 16 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law
available
at
No.
07-007,
2007),
Paper
Series,
Paper
Research
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-968513 (reporting in the for-profit sector "anecdotal evidence
suggest[ing] that the heavy demands placed on independent directors and the concomitant
threat of increased liability discourage people from agreeing to serve, thus creating a scarcity
of well-qualified independent candidates").
50. See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of
Recent Legislative Proposalsfor Nonprofit Reform, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 595 (2005).
51. See id.
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requirements and whether these goals resonate in the nonprofit context.
Independence requirements seek to improve fiduciaries' and boards'
abilities to fulfill their roles by three main routes. First, independent
directors might be used to address concerns about directorial and
managerial integrity, particularly self-dealing issues. 5 2
Second,
independent directors might improve efficiency, by adding a voice to the
boardroom from outside the tunnel vision of those within it or otherwise
closely related to the organization. 53 Third, independent directors might be
seen as less subject to potentially damaging domination by a powerful
executive or other influential board member. 54 The independent director
concept has been the object of much criticism, 55 but the independent
director idea and its purposes remain relevant as policy proscriptions
52. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 607-09 (1982) (evaluating, in a pathbreaking article on the
subject of independent directors, the role of these actors in monitoring the integrity of
management); Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 Del. J.
Corp. L. 73, 80 (2007) ("[O]ne role for NMDs [non-management directors] is as a monitor
of related-party transactions, in which there can be a conflict of interest."); Note, Beyond
"Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 1553, 1561 (2006) ("More narrowly conceived, independence represents a form of
insurance against managerial self-dealing.").
53. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 607-09 (suggesting, and then criticizing, independent
directors' ability to improve a corporation's efficiency by providing an outsider's point of
view); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 798
(2001) ("'Independence' is a subjective concept that connotes a willingness to bring a high
degree of rigor and skeptical objectivity to the evaluation of company management and its
plans and proposals."); Note, supra note 52, at 1557-60 (describing views of independent
directors as "objective monitors" or "unaffiliated professionals").
54. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in
CorporationLaw: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director,52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
557, 563-64 (1984); Clarke, supra note 52, at 81 ("In the United States, the NMD has
traditionally been seen as the solution to the problem of managerial domination of the
board."); Note, supra note 52, at 1556 (noting the role of the independent directors in
avoiding managerial domination (citing and referring to the review of managerial
domination concerns in Delaware special litigation committee decisions by Joshua L.
Vineyard, Comment, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same? Twenty Years
of Corporate Board Domination and the Aronson v. Lewis Standard, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1067 (2004))).
At one time, independent directors were even considered as possible advocates for
corporate social responsibility. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 639-58. In today's account of
independent directors, this role is largely absent, perhaps due to the ascendancy of the
shareholder-primacy paradigm.
55. The two major studies of independent directors' impact on firm value have reached
inconsistent results and spawned some controversy over their accuracy. See Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Non-correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm
Performance, 27 J. Corp. L. 231 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1529-33 (2005) (discussing
the ineffectiveness of the independent director requirement for audit committees); Kathleen
M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance? 16-17
(July 2007) (unpublished manuscript, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1002421 (canvassing the surveys and the
controversy surrounding them); see also Clarke, supra note 52, at 75-77 (discussing
similarly inconclusive results).
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favoring nonprofit independent director requirements mount. 56 Thus, this
part will elaborate somewhat further the features of these three main areas
of concern and relate how independence requirements have thus far been
drawn to address them.
A. Integrity Concerns and FinancialInterest
Limiting breaches of integrity is one goal to which director independence
requirements address themselves. 57 Of course, any fiduciary can face
moments when her personal interests come into conflict (or possible
conflict) with the interests of the organization she serves. The integrity goal
of independent director requirements, however, posits that independent
directors might well have fewer of these conflicts as a class, owing to the
lack of ties to the organization that brands them as independent in the first
place. 58 As such, independent directors also frequently can play an
important structural role in managing both consistent and onetime
59
conflicts.
The role of independent directors in dealing with consistent conflicts is
most obvious in proposals to require nonprofit audit committees to be
staffed by independent directors. In an audit, managers (who may or may
not be directors) will have the operations and performance of their
organization critiqued by an outside viewer. This is a critique of the
organization and of its management. When the outside reviewer (the
auditor) submits a report on the organization's operations and performance,
managers have a personal interest in supporting the report's positive
findings and downplaying its negatives. Thus, an audit committee staffed
by independent directors is designed to be able to perform the audit
60
oversight role assigned to it, free of personal conflicts.
In addition to their role in dealing with consistent conflicts of interest like
these, independent director requirements are linked to the idea that these
directors can often play a useful role in onetime conflict situations. In these
situations, such as a transaction between a director and her nonprofit,
protection for the transaction is likely available if financially disinterested

56. See generally Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, "Independence"
and the Nonprofit Board: A General Counsel's Guide, 39 J. Health L. 497 (2006) (reporting
and commenting on this trend). But see Suzanne Perry, Key Senator Has No Plans for
Legislation to Curb Charitable Abuses, Chron. of Philanthropy, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/284 1/key-senator-has-no-plans-for-legislation-to-

curb-charitable-abuses (suggesting that the current chair of the Senate Finance Committee
may step away from nonprofit governance reform generally).
57. See supra note 52.
58. See Note, supra note 52, at 1555-56.
59. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 608-09; Clarke, supra note 52, at 80.
60. A similar role for independent directors can be seen in proposals to establish
credentialing requirements mandating independence for compensation and other board
committees. See Peregrine & Broccolo, supra note 56, at 513 (addressing the application of
independence standards to nonprofit board committees beyond audit, although noting that
"[t]he most common application of independence standards is at the audit committee level").
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directors review and reasonably approve it after full disclosure. 6 1 Again
owing to their lack of ties to the organization, independent directors will
often be members of the financially disinterested group that serves in the
review and approval capacity. Maintaining a group of directors able to play
this important role is another benefit of requiring a majority, or at least
some critical mass, of independent directors.
The credentials of independent directors may lead to fewer situations
where their personal interests conflict with that of their organizations.
However, this will not necessarily be the case.
The concepts of
62
independence and financial disinterestedness are not identical.
Independent directors may also be financially interested directors as to a
particular transaction. Directors with no contacts or conflicts with the
organization at the time of their nominations could become involved in
interested transactions during the course of their terms. Moreover, this may
happen by design, as when a director is recruited in the hope of securing
some product or service for the organization through his contacts in a
particular industry. Or such a director might be found to have a unique skill
set useful to the organization only long after she joins the board, and the
organization would like to approach her to work as a consultant. Future
events cannot be planned for comprehensively, and anything can happen. 6 3
When they do, other directors not financially interested in the transaction in
question-whether or not they are "independent" directors in some broader
sense-can and should be called on to play the review and approval role
necessary to legitimate and shelter the conflicted transaction.
Therefore, while independence reforms and procedures for disinterested
review of conflicted transactions can be related, the ideas of independence
and disinterest need not entirely overlap. Some director independence
proposals would make this overlap more significant and formal, however,
by designating as non-independent those directors who have experienced
interested transactions in the past. Early proposals limiting audit committee
membership to independent directors in New York would have refused
independent director status to those who "have participated in any...
interested party transactions

.

.

.

within the previous year.

'64

A

61. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., §§ 330, 375 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007). The Principles here essentially follow the familiar safe harbor paradigm of corporate
law. The more lenient business judgment rule scrutiny will apply to an interested transaction
that has received advance approval by disinterested board members, and the burden of proof

will rest with the transaction's challenger. Without proper advance approval, interested
transactions will be subject to strict fairness review and the burden of proving fairness will
lie with the defendant fiduciary.
62. See id. § 310 cmt. c(l), at 66 ("The concept of independence overlaps with, but is
analytically distinct from, the concept of (usually financial) disinterest."); Peregrine &
Broccolo, supra note 56, at 501-02 (contrasting independence as a structural question with
conflicts of interest, which can occur episodically).
63. The American Red Cross Governance Report offers one method for managing
potential changes in independent status: an annual independence questionnaire to be
completed by all board members. See Am. Red Cross Bd. of Governors, supra note 17, at 17.
64. See N.Y. Legislative Bill Drafting Comm'n, supra note 41, § 3.
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Massachusetts proposal, also on audit committee membership, would have
on independent status for any director who
placed a permanent 6ban
5
experienced a conflict.

B. Objectivity Concerns and the Questfor Efficiency
In addition to avoiding breaches of integrity, independent director
requirements arguably can contribute to more efficient direction and
management by nonprofit boards. 66 The credentials that mark directors as
independent are intended to afford them some greater level of objectivity as
to the organization's internal affairs than their non-independent
colleagues. 67 They can use this "outsider" perspective to challenge
conventional wisdom, ask more probing questions, "think outside the box,"
and offer the other benefits of objectivity touted by auditors, management
consultants, and other professional outsiders. 68 Obtaining a core group of
such objective voices on the board is one of the main goals of independent
director requirements.
The benefits of this objectivity can extend to all of the jobs that directors
are tasked to perform. For example, objectivity will be valuable in carrying
out the board's role in hiring and evaluating the performance of its top
executives and setting their compensation. 69 When engaging in oversight
on audit committees, independent directors will not be saddled with the
baggage of working as part of the executive team. Nor, on some definitions

65. Press Release, Office of Mass. Att'y Gen. Tom Reilly, supra note 42 (proposing a
statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 80(3), to require, in addition to non-compensation (other
than for director or audit committee service), that members of the audit committee not "have
participated, at any point in the past, in any related party contracts or transactions").
66. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, supra note 36, at 23
(emphasizing the importance of "independent and non-management board members.., to
assure the exercise of independent judgment in key committees and general board decisionmaking"); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 78 ("[T]he effort to
find independent members is important to the long-term success and accountability of the
organization .... ").
67. See supra note 53.
68. See Bruce F. Dravis, Independent Director's Guidebook 3-4 (2007) (describing
observations by commentators that "independent review of key management decisions also
may reduce the effect of potentially negative decision-making biases"); see also Martin
Kihn, "Outside the Box ": The Inside Story, Fast Company, June 2005, at 40 (describing the
clichrd nature of the phrase "outside the box" and its frequent use by consultants).
69. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320, at 112 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (stating that hiring the chief executive and evaluating his or her performance is one of
the normal functions of a nonprofit board); Jack B. Siegel, A Desktop Guide for Nonprofit
Directors, Officers, and Advisors: Avoiding Trouble While Doing Good § 4.4(a), at 88-89
(2006) (advising nonprofit fiduciaries on how to approach the "common decision" of how to
set compensation for executive directors and senior officers); Francie Ostrower & Melissa
M. Stone, Governance: Research Trends, Gaps, and Future Prospects, in The Nonprofit
Sector: A Research Handbook 612, 613 (2d ed. 2006) (describing hiring and oversight of
the CEO as one of a nonprofit boards' traditional responsibilities); see also Langevoort,
supra note 53, at 801-02 (explaining that selection and evaluation of the CEO is one of the
three main roles of the for-profit corporate board).
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at least, 70 will they be limited by other financial, familial, or social
relationships with this team or its leader, allowing their review to be
untainted and rigorous. 7 1 Likewise, the board's more general monitoring
function may be improved by the existence of a powerful group of
independent directors without daily familiarity with (or, even co-option
into) management's worldview. 7 2 Their outsider status may enable them to
engage in less bounded strategic thinking. 73 It may allow them to play a
more constructive role as the mediator among the varying constituencies of
the organization. 74 Objective voices are valuable in accomplishing all of
these important tasks.
Of course, objectivity has its disadvantages as well. As its critics in the
for-profit arena have recognized, to some degree, objectivity must be traded
off against expertise. 75 Those without organizational involvement that
would threaten their objectivity will likewise lack expertise regarding the
particular entity at issue, and perhaps will lack more general expertise
within the relevant industry or area of operation, depending on how far one
is willing to push the search for objectivity. This lack of expertise may be
compounded by reliance on management and other non-independent
directors for information necessary to make the very decisions for which
their objectivity is prized. 76 If such reliance becomes substantial, the

70. For much more on defining "independent director," see infra Part III.
71. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis
166 (1976) (asserting that for a board to effectively play its important role in monitoring the
CEO, it must be independent of the CEO).
72. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 632 ("For improving management's performance as a
wealth maximizer, the outside director's value is to be found principally in the traditional
function of availability for expert advice and for consultation from a less involved point of
view.").
73. See Dravis, supra note 68, at 4; Langevoort, supra note 53, at 798 (describing how
independent directors might be seen to help overcome the cognitive biases of management).
74. Cf Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, DirectorAccountability and the Mediating
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 422 (2001) (describing a view of forprofit corporate boards' role as to mediate among the potentially conflicting interests of the
various groups involved in corporations).
75. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and
the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1305, 1340 (2005) (opining that
"the challenge is to use the occasional board opening to strike the best balance between
independence and other desired traits such as industry experience or financial expertise");
William T. Allen, An Outside-the-Box Idea: Go Inside for Directors, Corporate Board
Member, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 58, 59 (advocating the retention of inside directors in order to
combat this problem).
76. See Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform:
Independence or Democracy?, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 1, 23 ("Unlike inside directors, who have
direct access to information by virtue of being employees or having other close ties to the
corporation, independent directors rely upon the reports of others for the information
necessary to discharge their monitoring duties."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 14344 (discussing the difficulties directors have obtaining information).
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promised objectivity of independent directors may be more perceived than
real.

77

C. Concerns About Domination
Finally, independent directors also have been urged as a partial counter to
the potentially destructive influence of domination. 7 8 Of course, the
concern about director domination is tied to the issues of integrity and
efficiency explored above. A dominating director may be able to push
through interested transactions without sufficient analysis and questioning.
Likewise, such a persona may pose obstacles to broad discussion of
strategic or tactical options. There is, however, also some separate content
to the domination concern.
Governance through a board of directors is, at bottom, a commitment to
governance by a group. 7 9 Committees likewise embrace the value of group
decision making. A dominating single force on a board or committee
severely undermines this core concept. Ideally, independent directors, due
to their lack of employment, familial, or other personal relationships with
such a dominating personality, would be able to curtail some of the effects
of domination, or avoid a situation of domination from arising altogether.
If so, independent director requirements could help boards avoid this
potential obstacle to achieving the group decision-making ideal nonprofit
corporate law envisions.
Of course, this assumes a very broad definition of independence, more
than the current and proposed requirements would demand. Furthermore,
the counter-domination benefit of independent directors can be challenged
as naive, on much the same type of argument as was used to challenge their
contributions to objectivity above.8 0 If independent directors count on the
dominating personality on the board to set the agenda, or at least to provide
them with much of the information they will need to make their decisions,
their ability to avoid or counteract her dominating influence will be
1
substantially limited.8

77. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 634 (warning that independent directors' "modesty"
may make it difficult for them to achieve efficiency gains for their corporations); Cosenza,
supra note 76, at 23 (addressing this dynamic).
78. See supra note 54.
79. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2002).
80. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
81. Even beyond the problems of agenda setting and informational asymmetry, a
dominating director might still, by force of personality or otherwise, be able to exercise
dominating influence. See Symposium Panel Discussion, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 319, 320
(1983). Professor Kenneth Andrews argues that such domination of independent directors
surely can occur. Id.
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D. DirectorIndependence Concerns and the Nonprofit Context
Much of the critical exploration of independent director requirements has

occurred in the for-profit context. Concerns around integrity, objectivity,
and domination, however, are also implicated by director independence
82
reforms in nonprofit board settings.
Certainly, instances of consistent and onetime conflicts of interest can
and do occur in nonprofits. Although nonprofit directors generally serve
voluntarily,8 3 nonprofit managers are often compensated and can serve on
boards. 84 Thus, consistent conflicts over evaluating their performance and
setting their compensation will occur. In addition, there is a case to be
made that conflict situations will be even more common in nonprofits, as
these resource-strapped entities often recruit board members with the
intention of securing their assistance in obtaining needed items or
services. 8 5
Although many times these director recruitment efforts
contemplate at- or below-cost arrangements, such arrangements are not
always possible given the directors' responsibilities to the other entities
they serve. Questions of conflict of interest are presented most starkly

82. This essay is only part of a larger effort to explore the issues raised by nonprofit
independent director requirements. See Boozang, supra note 55 (discussing the genesis of
independent director reforms in the for-profit sector and the problems with applying them in
the nonprofit sector); Peregrine & Broccolo, supra note 56, at 498-501 (discussing the
policy focus and the "evolution" of independence requirements in the for-profit sector in a
piece recommending best practices for independence in the nonprofit context); see also
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and
Regulation 436 (2004) (commenting that in 2004 "[t]he definition of 'independent directors'
is ... in need of clarification, particularly as to whether it includes donors or other persons
dealing regularly with the charity such as consultants and professionals").
83. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 82, at 168; Francie Ostrower, Urban Inst., Nonprofit
Governance in the United States: Findings on Performance and Accountability from the
First
National
Representative
Study
1.1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411479_Nonprofit Governance.pdf (finding that only
two percent of boards compensated directors); BoardSource, Nonprofit Governance Index
2004, at 8 (2005), http://www.boardsource.org/dl.asp?documentid=424 ("Board service
remains almost entirely voluntary. Only 2 percent of participating organizations pay board
members a fee or honorarium for their service.").
84. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 82, at 168; Ostrower, supra note 83, at 20 (noting
that "3 percent [of board members] worked for the nonprofit itself"). In connection with
executive's board service, Professor Marion Fremont-Smith notes the importance of setting
executive compensation "based on the reasonable worth of services and ... not [as] a
disguise for a distribution of profits." Fremont-Smith, supra note 82, at 168 (citing the
applicability of excise tax rules under I.R.C. § 4958 (West 2006) on compensation
arrangements that constitute excess benefit transactions).
85. See Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 10, at 178-79 ("In many situations, interested
transactions are a healthy necessity. They may provide access to resources unavailable from
the marketplace ....
[The appropriateness of a transaction] depends greatly on its facts and
circumstances and the director's motivations for entering the transaction."); Fremont-Smith,
supra note 82, at 236 ("In many situations, self-dealing transactions are the only means by
which a nonprofit corporation can gain access to goods and services that would otherwise be
too expensive to afford."); Ostrower, supra note 83, at 8 (reporting and expanding on a
finding that "financial transactions between organizations and board members are
extensive").
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when deals are struck at above-market prices, but even market rate
transactions between directors and their nonprofits may implicate self86
dealing concerns.
Efficiency concerns are also present on nonprofit boards. A lack of
objectivity can blind those acting in service of a charitable mission just as it
might those charged with serving the interests of shareholders. Those on a
nonprofit's board may be so committed to serving the mission they have
worked years to articulate that they fail to recognize the impact of change
on their programs' efficacy. 87 These concerns may well be even greater in
the nonprofit context, without clear lines of accountability to groups like
shareholders 88 and the limited availability of enforcement. 89 These
differences have, in fact, been suggested as explanations for why nonprofits

86. See, e.g., Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos (Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of the State of N.Y. Feb. 5, 1997), http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html (finding
breach of the duty of loyalty by directors who received a lucrative insurance brokerage
contract from the university, although recognizing that due to a lack of proper disclosure "we
will never know whether or not Adelphi obtained the lowest cost coverage best suited to its
needs, or whether another broker would have been a better choice"); Vacco v.
Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding that the Board of Regents
report cited above alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for fiduciary breach).
The self-dealing provisions applicable to private foundations under the federal tax code
suggest that even at-cost conflicts can raise serious issues. See I.R.C. §§ 4941(a)(1),
4941(d)(1)(A) (West 2006) (subjecting to excise taxes any "sale or exchange, or leasing, of
property between a private foundation" and a director); Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4941(d)-2(b)(2),
53.4941(d)-2(c)(2), 53.4941(d)-2(d)(3) (2006) (excluding from the definition of self-dealing
only such transactions made "without charge" or "without interest").
87. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for Mission
Control, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 1181, 1184-86 (noting incumbent fiduciaries resistance to
permitting mission evolution in the takeover context); Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful
Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and
Public Policy, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1089, 1122 (2001) (addressing directors' unwillingness to
recognize the potential value of the change a merger would bring to "the long-term survival
and well-being of the organization's mission and its resources").
88. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin and Trust in the
Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 1, 2 (2005) (noting
"charitable corporations' lack of shareholders and market for corporate control"); see also
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and
For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 489 (1996) (similar); Henry
Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good
Policy?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 807, 821 (1989) ("[E]ven in nonprofits with members
there is no possibility of disciplining managers through a market for corporate control, since
unlike business corporations nonprofits have no stockholders with a right to both net assets
and control."); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 227-28 ("[I]n the nonprofit world, owners are not
well-defined; their voting rights are questionable or non-existent; charitable goals are
ambiguous.... There is no market for corporate control .... " (footnote omitted)).
89. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 82, at 352 (noting that although state attorneys
general have managed to achieve some nonprofit regulatory and enforcement successes,
"[a]ll of them operate with severely limited budgets, which has meant a shortage of legal and
accounting support"); Brody, supra note 10, at 479 ("Funding for charity enforcement has
never been high, at either the state or federal level .... "); James J. Fishman, Improving
CharitableAccountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 257-65 (2003) (addressing the limitations on
nonprofit enforcement presented by both standing rules and governmental resources).
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tend to be more dogged than for-profits in pursuing goals and maintaining
programs long past their useful life. 90
Finally, of course, those with a desire to dominate the opinions of others
are not to be found solely in the for-profit sector. In pursuit of noble or
less-than-noble intentions, boards of all types and sizes can struggle with
dominating members. 9 1 The passion that is required to dedicate oneself to
service of a nonprofit's mission might even feed the dominating potential of
such individuals.
The integrity, objectivity, and domination concerns underpinning
independence requirements are persistent issues for nonprofit boards and
the nonprofit sector. Thus, director independence proposals can be usefully
analyzed and evaluated with respect to these concerns. Yet some of the
implications of these concerns for drafting independent director
requirements, and particularly for crafting a definition of independence, will
be unique to the nonprofit context. The next part will turn to these
important points.
III. DEFINING NONPROFIT DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE

It would seem at this point necessary, if not drastically overdue, to
consider the question of defining nonprofit director independence in more
detail. As discussed above, many definitions already exist, in both extant
requirements and proposed reforms. 92 These definitions track the integrity,
objectivity, and domination issues raised above to some degree. Still, no
single definition comprehensively addresses all of them. This part outlines
some of the more thorny issues that arise in defining independence in the

90. See, e.g., Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 10, at 101 ("Many nonprofits survive too
long, drawing down their resources to finance annual deficits, or they stay alive on the basis
of faded but still useful reputations. Boards may be embarrassed to close .... ").
91. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, supra note 36, at 27
(discussing the dominating director phenomenon in the nonprofit context).
92. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5227(b) (West 2006) ("Any person currently being
compensated by the corporation .. "); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(l)(A) (2005)
(defining "financially interested person[s]" as one "who has received or is entitled to receive
compensation"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:6-a (1999) (limiting the "position of chairperson
or presiding officer of the board" to non-employees); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-33-27(3)(a)
(2005) (defining "financially interested individuals" to include "[i]ndividuals who have
received or are entitled to receive compensation"); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 IB, § 8.13(b)(1)
(1997) (defining "financially interested persons" to include "[i]ndividuals who have received
or are entitled to receive compensation"); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra
note 29, at 75 (excluding those compensated for full- or part-time work from the definition
of independent); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 32, at 15 (excluding those
receiving compensation as employees or independent contractors, those whose compensation
is determined by such individuals, those receiving other financial benefits from the
organization, as well as those with various familial relationships to individuals falling into
any of the former categories); Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., supra note 16, at 13
(defining a director who is independent as one "free of any relationship with the corporation
or its management that may impair or appear to impair the director's ability to make
independent judgments").
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nonprofit context, and attempts to resolve them for drafters of nonprofit
director independence reforms.
A. Employment and Employment-Like Relationships
The most frequent credential named for independent directors is status as
a nonemployee of the relevant organization. 9 3 Along this vein, paid
consultants, advisors, or officers are often also excluded, as are any partners
of the organization or its affiliates. 94 It is easy to appreciate how screening
out employees and others with employment-like relationships with an
organization would help independent directors to play the roles ascribed to
them above. Such individuals will regularly experience conflicts of
interest, in each instance of compensation or negotiation of a profit- and/or
loss-sharing agreement. They also have their livelihoods and potential
fortunes intimately bound up with current management's vision for the
organization. These ties obviously would substantially limit their ability to
Finally, employment by the
bring objectivity to the boardroom.
organization, other business relationships with it, or both, would make such
individuals particularly susceptible to domination by directors inclined to
exercise their influence.
Following the lead of most existing and proposed nonprofit independence
requirements, it seems wise to remove employees from the independent
category. Challenging breaches of integrity, offering objective analysis and
criticism, and avoiding domination all will be difficult for a nonprofit
employee on the board. Others with a direct and consistent financial
interest in the organization, like paid advisors and co-venturers of various
types, have and should be screened out of the definition of independence on
the same logic.
Of course, those with employment and employment-like relationships
with a nonprofit have much to offer as directors, in terms of information,
93. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310, at 67 (Tentative Draft No. 1,

2007) (noting that definitions of internal independence commonly focus on compensation
and other financial benefits); Boozang, supra note 55, at 25 (stating that the few available
nonprofit definitions of independence "focus on the absence of a financial relationship").
See generally Clarke, supra note 52 (discussing the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements for for-profit director independence centering upon employment regardless of
the term used to describe independence). Specifically, Donald C. Clarke discusses the
differences between "non-interested, independent, outside, non-executive, non-employee,
and disinterested" directors. Id. at 78 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
94. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(1)(A) (excluding from the definition
of independence any individual compensated by the organization for personal services
within a twelve-month period, including independent contractors and consultants); Panel on
the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 75 (excluding independent contractors
and others receiving "material financial benefits (i.e., service contracts, grants, or other
payments) from the organization except as a member of the charitable class served by the
organization" from the definition of independent board member); see also Peregrine &
Broccolo, supra note 56, at 523-24 (suggesting that professional or advisory relationships
with an organization are ones nonprofits "may wish to consider" in drafting a standard for
director independence).
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insight, commitment, and manpower.
Nonprofit employees and paid
advisors do regularly serve on boards, 95 and surely do so with great
distinction. They are an extremely useful set of potential board members,
having relevant information, experience, and expertise, as well as a
commitment to the organization. 96 But, due to their potential conflicts, lack
of objectivity, and susceptibility to domination, employees and those with
employment-like relationships cannot logically serve the role we desire
independent directors to play.
This seems unlikely to be a problem for independence requirements.
Although many boards include employees as members, they should be able
to obtain a majority of directors from outside their ranks. Likewise, staffing
compensation and audit committees with these non-employed or otherwise
directly financially interested individuals should not pose too high a hurdle.
It seems a reasonable assumption that most boards with employee members
include only a small number of them, perhaps the executive director or
97
chief executive officer and one or two other quite senior managers.
Indeed, the existing independence requirements in four states do screen out
paid employees, 98 and have operated in those states for some years without
creating an obviously greater shortage of qualified directors in those
jurisdictions.
A special complication arises, however, in dealing with the nonemployee component of the independent director definition in the nonprofit
context. How should independence requirements deal with volunteers? 99 It
is helpful to evaluate the question of volunteers in light of the three
concerns at which independence requirements are aimed. Volunteers do not
have a direct and consistent financial interest in their organization in the
form of wages or salary. Thus, the likelihood of their financial interests
conflicting with that of the nonprofit seems little different than entirely
unrelated potential directors.

95. See supra note 84.
96. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 official cmt. (1987) (noting that
employees may be "invaluable" board members).
97. In fact, "[t]he practice of including the executive director as a voting board member
is less common on nonprofit boards than on corporate boards, but we did find it among a
substantial minority (33 percent) of respondents, including 21 percent of those with a paid

CEO/executive director." Ostrower, supra note 83, at 20.
98. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5227(b)(1) (West 2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713A(1)(A); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-33-27(3)(a) (2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 1B, § 8.13(b)(1)
(1997); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292:6-a (1999) (prohibiting employees from serving as
board chair or presiding officer).
99. By volunteers, this essay refers to individuals who volunteer their time to the
nonprofit in addition to their service on the board. The American Red Cross Governance
Report suggests a distinction, for independence purposes, between volunteers and volunteer
managers. See Am. Red Cross Bd. of Governors, supra note 17, at 53. If volunteers were to
be added to the categories of individuals excluded from service as independent directors,
such distinctions might well be necessary. At present, however, they are beyond the scope
of this essay.
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Yet, in terms of their objectivity, the situation of volunteers seems much
closer to that of employees. They are enmeshed in the current programs
and operations of the nonprofit. The extent of this enmeshment will likely
vary with the extent of their volunteer service. At least those who volunteer
significant time to the organization, though, are at serious risk that their
objectivity will be clouded by the current vision of that organization and its
programs.
Volunteers' potential for domination is a bit of a mixed bag. If the power
to dominate resides in a directors' ability to harm a fellow director's
financial interest in the organization, volunteers' lack of compensation
should insulate them from this influence. But, the capacity for domination
can also flow from a role in setting the agenda for the organization,
controlling its culture, and the charisma of leadership. If a director intent
on dominating has a major role in setting the organization's vision and
leading the team that pursues it, volunteers are certainly subject to potential
domination by this individual.
With these partial and conflicting results on how volunteers will play the
role of independent directors, I would hesitate to remove them categorically
from the definition of independence for nonprofit directors. This hesitation
stems in part from concern about potentially limiting the pool of
independent director candidates so severely that there are insufficient
candidates to fill the needed positions. In addition, it is motivated by the
reality that volunteers are particularly valuable as potential board members.
They have proven by their volunteer service that they are willing to devote
their time and energy to the organization, and devotion of both is required
to serve effectively as a director. Moreover, their volunteer service
suggests a commitment to the mission and activities of the organization that
directors also will need.
Of course, defining independent director to exclude volunteers would not
bar them from board service. However, screening volunteers from the
definition of independence might be perceived as denigrating the service of
this vital group. I am anxious about sending the message that independent
directors, the ones we trust to guard the integrity and the objectivity of the
boardroom, cannot be volunteers. It seems unnecessarily harsh to state
categorically that volunteers' commitment to the organization, their
willingness to dedicate their precious time and energy for free, makes them
less able stewards of the organization. Doing so might not only limit the
ranks of potential candidates for independent directorships, but also shrink
the ranks of needed volunteers in other capacities. For these reasons, the
exclusion from the independent director category should be limited to
compensated employees.
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B. Family Relationships
Family members again seem an easy target for independence reforms.
The conflicts of fiduciaries and other employees will become the conflicts
of their family members.' 0 0 And ties of blood or affinity with other
directors or management may dampen directors' enthusiasm for challenging
conflicted transactions. They may trust the opinions of their family
members too much, sacrificing objectivity or submitting to domination.
When the dominating presence is a relative, the family member may
willingly submit to her domination, out of either trust or familial fealty.
When a dominating executive or other director has power over one's
relatives, domination may not be voluntary, but is also quite likely. Thus,
the exclusion of family members of directors, officers, and employees from
the category of independent director follows clearly from the policy goals
of these proposals.
Such exclusions have been included in both existing and proposed
independence requirements. 10 1 Existing independent board composition
rules in several states exclude from the independent category relatives of
those with financial relationships to the nonprofit. 10 2 The Nonprofit Panel's
final report made a similar recommendation. 10 3 New Hampshire goes
further, and addresses the relationships of directors to each other. It
requires charitable nonprofits to have boards of at least five members, and
can be "of the same immediate family or related by
none of these members
04
blood or marriage."'
It is worth noting, however, the practical problems that can arise with this
definitional choice, if independence reforms are to be applied to nonprofit
private foundations. 10 5 Foundations, especially ones associated with the
generosity of a particular family, may have employees from that family and

100. Cf I.R.C. §§ 4946(a)(1)(D), 4958(f)(1)(B) (West 2006) (including family members
in the definition of "disqualified persons," for whom transactions with relevant tax-exempt
entities are prohibited or targeted for greater scrutiny).
101. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292:6-a; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11B, § 8.13(b)(2); Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 75.
102. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5227(b)(2) (including as an "interested person," "[a]ny
brother, sister, ancestor, descendant, spouse, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, or father-in-law of any [interested person]"); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(l)(B) (defining "financially interested person[s]" to include "spouse,
brother, sister, parent or child" of a compensated individual); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-3327(3)(b)-(c) (defining "financially interested individuals" to include "[a]ny parent, child,
child of a spouse, brother, or sister" of a compensated individual, the spouse of the specified
relations, and the spouse of a compensated individual); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 B, § 8.13(b)(2)
(defining "financially interested persons" to include "[a]ny spouse, brother, sister, parent or
child of any [compensated individual]").
103. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 75. Notably,
while certain state statutes apply broadly across nonprofits, see supra note 102, the
Nonprofit Panel final report would apply its independence requirement to public charities
only. See id.
104. See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292:6-a.
105. Id.
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boards composed largely of family members. 10 6 If the drafters of
independence reforms intend to apply their proposals to family foundations,
and particularly if they take New Hampshire's lead, they should expect
some resistance and questions of whether the independence reform game is
worth this particular candle. Indeed, New Hampshire, the state that has
addressed familial ties most aggressively in its independent director
requirement, appears to have decided that applying its rule to family
foundations is not advisable. It specifically excepts private foundations
from its independent director requirement entirely. 10 7 The Nonprofit
Panel's recommendations for both government mandate and self-regulatory
108
effective practice do the same.
Such a categorical exception for foundations is, of course, one way to
make a restriction on familial ties among directors workable. But such an
exception seems to undermine the idea that independent director
requirements are linked to improving the ability of directors or boards to
serve their assigned functions. There is no reason to believe that private
foundations as a group are less susceptible to the problems of financial
conflict, lack of objectivity, and domination than are nonprofits generally.
In fact, criticisms of governance and accountability are often leveled with
109
particular concern for the conduct of foundations and their fiduciaries.
The exception suggests instead a link between independence
requirements and a concern about increasing the diversity of nonprofit
boards. It suggests that public charities 110 should have a broader range of

106. See Council on Founds., Family Foundation Board Makeup tbl.6 (2004) (on file with
author) (finding, in a survey of over 1000 board members at nearly 150 family foundations,
that 77% of directors were family members and that 45% of the foundations surveyed have
boards consisting only of family members); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report,
supra note 29, at 78.
Indeed, this problem may well extend beyond foundations. See Ostrower, supra note 83,
at 20-21 (finding "[flully 26 percent of boards of nonprofits with under $100,000 in
expenses have members who are related to one another" and significant, though lower,
percentages in larger nonprofits as well).
107. See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292:6-a.
108. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 75, 78
(recognizing this difficulty, and thus applying its independent board composition reform
recommendation to public charities only); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 32, at
15 (noting as well that its board independence principle would not apply to foundations and
a few other types of nonprofits for whom its requirements would pose special difficulties).
109. See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform, supra note 16 (including statements of
former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson and former head of the New York Attorney
General Charities Bureau William Josephson, among others, commenting specifically on
perceived abuses in foundations); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's
Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 Emory L.J.
1093 (2001) (criticizing governance and operations at many private foundations); William
Josephson, Assistant Att'y Gen.-in-Charge, Charities Bureau, Remarks to the Funders
Alliance of Upstate New York 7 (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with author) ("With respect to the
private foundation boards, often they seem not to be able to distinguish between the money
they gave to their foundations and their own.").
110. The universe of charitable nonprofits exempt from federal tax laws is split roughly
into two categories: the public charity and the private foundation. See I.R.C. § 509 (West
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persons as board members, perhaps because they benefit from widespread
public support, or engage in programs and activities relied upon by the
general public, or both. The New Hampshire statute's own text supports
this view, stating that its provisions are put forward "[i]n the interest of
encouraging diversity of discussion, connection with the public, and public
confidence." 11' Private foundations, 112 presumably with more confined
purposes and sources of support, may staff their boards from a narrower
group. This alternative view of the purpose of independent director
requirements is certainly defensible, and might coexist with the view of
independence requirements as aimed toward improving governance.
Indeed, a case can clearly be made that broad diversity of directors will add
to the board's ability to avoid and manage conflicts of interest, maintain
sufficient objectivity, and avoid domination. However, the current focus
among legislators and regulators pursuing nonprofit law reform seems
intent on improving governance and preventing abuse directly, rather than
broadening the general representativeness of nonprofit boards in order to do
3
so.11

To address the serious concerns regarding integrity,
domination, defining independent nonprofit director to
members of compensated employees and others with
interest is quite sensible. Whether to screen out related
more troublesome theoretical and practical questions.

efficiency, and
exclude family
direct financial
directors raises

2006) (defining private foundation). Public charities are those organizations that are either
traditional charitable institutions (hospitals, schools, etc.) or meet one of several tests of
broad public support. See id. § 509(a)(1)-(4). As such, "[p]ublic charities ...derive most of
their support from government or the general public, or the nature of their activities makes
them accountable to a broader constituency." Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 10, at 751.
111. N.H. Rev. Stat. § 292:6-a.
112. Private foundations are defined by default; the term includes any organization
exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) that does not qualify as a public charity. See I.R.C. §
509(a); see also supra note 110 (discussing the definition of "public charity"). Private
foundations are typified by a single or small group of funders, ongoing financial support
derived from investment income, and operations consisting of grant making, rather than
running direct charitable programs or activities. See Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of TaxExempt Organizations § 12. 1(a), at 352 (9th ed. 2007).
113. Although it has not been the dominant theme in these reform efforts, there have been
instances in which improving board representativeness, in various respects, has been raised.
See, e.g., Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 1220(a), I.R.C. 501(q)(l)(D)(i) (West 2007)
(demonstrating congressional interest in board representativeness in at least one context, by
requiring credit counseling agencies to have a governing body "controlled by persons who
represent the broad interests of the public"); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism
and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937, 985-99 (2004)
(discussing the Hershey case in which representation for members of the Hershey
community seemed important to regulators); Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey:
Community Accountability and the Law in Modern American Philanthropy, 65 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 1 (2003). Moreover, board diversity, another possible indicator of representativeness,
certainly needs improvement. For example, a recent Urban Institute study found whites
represented eighty-six percent of board members. See Ostrower, supra note 83, at 18
(reporting this finding and questioning "the ability of many boards to truly represent and
respond to the diversity of the public they serve").
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C. Donor Relationships

The difficulty in crafting a definition of independence for nonprofit
directors only increases as one considers other possible categories for
exclusion from this status. Donors pose perhaps the trickiest problems for
defining independent nonprofit directors. The donor category addressed
here is intended to denote those donors whose contributions are substantial,
either in objective terms or within the budget of the relevant nonprofit.
Nominal donations signifying one's belief in or support of an organization
are certainly valuable and, when aggregated across many donors, they may
be financially quite significant. However, small donations by a donordirector are unlikely to implicate the issues of integrity, objectivity, and
domination, as would a director's history (and potential future prospects) of
making large donations.
Substantial contributions certainly create financial relationships between
donors and donee nonprofits. A donor's financial involvement with and
commitment to her nonprofit also may undermine her ability to offer
objectivity or make her a potential subject or source of domination.
Donors, however, are an important constituency for nonprofits, 114 and many
substantial donors desire, if not expect, that their donations will be
accompanied by board membership.l1 5 Moreover, many nonprofits in turn
desire, if not expect, that once an individual joins their board, he will make
sizeable donations. 116 Thus, answering the question whether donor status
should exclude potential directors from the independent category raises
both theoretical and practical difficulties that require further consideration.

114. See Murray S. Weitzman et al., The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference 91
tbl.4.1 (2002) (showing private contributions representing nearly twenty percent of total

independent sector revenue, thirty-five percent if health-care services are excluded); Brody,
supra note 10, at 473 (describing donors as one of the constituencies of charities, to whom
they must consider their accountability obligations).
115. See Boozang, supra note 55, at 24 (pointing to the "desire to attract potential donors"
as the primary reason that "[n]onprofit boards tend to be larger than for-profit boards"); see
also Why Do People Join Boards?, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev., Spring 2005, at 48, 48
(noting that it is common for board seats to be offered to and expected by major donors).
116. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, supra note 36, at 21
(noting that "contributing or raising money for the organization is often an explicit or
implicit expectation of nonprofit board members");

Brody, supra note 34, at 539

("Membership on the boards of some cultural and other high status, donation reliant
organizations depends on generous monetary contributions-notoriously, some even have a
known 'price list."'); Pamela Ryckman, Getting into Charity Through Its Board, Fin. Times,
July 20, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/cc12f36a-36d6-11dc-9f6d-0000779fd2ac.html

(reporting that "[m]ost non-profit organisations ask that board members make a donation that
is 'personally significant"' and give or get up to a set goal amount); see also Fisher Howe,
Fund Raising: The Roles of the Board and the Staff in Nonprofit Governance: The
Executive's Guide 249, 250-51, 253-54 (Victor Futter & George W. Overton eds., 1997)
(advocating that every board member should annually contribute to the organization, yet
offering some criticism of the practice of setting a minimum required contribution);
Boozang, supra note 55, at 27 (strongly critiquing the practice of requiring board member
contributions).
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We can begin with the concern over conflicts of interest and potential
breaches of integrity. A donor has no continuing or residual claim on the
funds he contributes to a nonprofit charity, 117 but his contributions do create
a financial relationship with the organization. Such relationships fit
uncomfortably, if at all, into our established idea of conflicted transactions.
Directors' conflicts of interest typically regulated by nonprofit law occur
when a director stands on both sides of a contract, such as a loan or
property sale by a director to his nonprofit, and will personally benefit from
the transaction's completion." 18
In some cases, of course, donations can create conflicts of interest
between a donor (or potential donor) and her donee nonprofit. If a donordirector desires to make a substantial contribution with restrictions on the
terms of its use by a recipient nonprofit, she may find herself on both sides
of a transaction-the contribution transaction-with her nonprofit. The
nonprofit may need to negotiate these terms, or the amount of the gift, as
not all gifts on all terms should be accepted. 1 19 The donor's personal
interest in the terms of the donation may differ from that of the nonprofit,
and her financial interests are certainly implicated, due to the potentially
significant tax advantages of some contributions. 120 So one certainly could
imagine contribution transactions where the two sides are, in some real
sense, adversaries.
Although potentially serious, this turn of events seems rather unusual.
Thus, alone, it would not suffice to argue for removing donors from the
definition of independence. Instead, the interested transaction approval
process 12 1 could be used to regulate these predictable, though infrequent,
conflicts. It would be sensible to prepare internal conflict rules and best

117. See Siegel, supra note 69, § 10.4(b), at 445 ("Under the common law, once a donor

makes a gift, he has no continuing interest in the property but may sue for its return if the
donor retained a right of reverter."); Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit
Organizationsand Those Who Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 Nonprofit Mgmt. &
Leadership 141, 147 (1995) (pointing out that only the attorney general, as "society's

representative" has the right to enforce gift restrictions under common law). But see Evelyn
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor
Standing, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1186 (2007) (discussing the complex and at times conflicting ways

courts view a donor's right to enforce gift restrictions and offering a compromise solution).
118. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 3 10(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)

(offering a nonexclusive list of typical conflict transactions, including compensation and
other financial transactions, use of charity's property or information, obtaining a material
benefit out of one's position with a charity, "action by or on behalf of an adverse party,"
competition with the charity, and taking a business opportunity).
119. See Siegel, supra note 69, § 10.4(a), at 441-43 (providing examples of the

difficulties that unscrutinized gift restrictions can create, and counseling negotiation in
advance); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes
Around, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 693, 697-708 (2007) (describing the negotiation process that

has come to mark the creation of restricted gifts, and noting that not all such gifts should be
accepted).
120. Deductions from federal income, estate and gift taxes are available for contributions
to qualifying donee nonprofits. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (West 2006).
121. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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practices that take account of such situations and offer guidance on using
transaction approval process or some other procedure to
the interested 22
manage them.]
Donors' ability to offer objectivity to boards, and thereby provide this
advantage of independence, can also be questioned. Donors might feel a
special commitment to particular parts of a nonprofit's program to which
they have donated funds. Even those donors who have contributed to the
nonprofit's general funds may be unable or unwilling to act as true
"outsiders."
Substantial donors, whether they have made a single
significant donation or amassed a history of substantial support through a
course of donating over many years, likely feel committed to maximizing
the impact of these donations. And this cuts both ways. On the one hand,
this may make them especially committed to considering every option to
improve their organization. On the other hand, it may wed them to the
conventional wisdom and practice of how the nonprofit is run. Having
thrown their support behind a particular vision of how to achieve the
organization's mission, or behind the individuals that have pursued that
vision during the time of their support, substantial donors may not
sufficiently consider the utility of changing course. These potential biases
threaten donors' ability to offer the benefits of objectivity that independent
directors are intended to provide.
The involvement, personal and financial, of donors and their nonprofits
also may challenge donors to offer the anti-domination benefits ascribed to
independent directors. If a donor, as described above, has become
committed to the vision of her nonprofit articulated by a particular powerful
individual within the organization (be it an executive director, chief
executive officer, or a fellow director), this influential individual may be
able to dominate the donor in their board interaction. Perhaps even more
1122. Many authorities encourage nonprofits to establish such conflict of interest policies.
See, e.g., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 330 gen. cmt. (a)(3), at 234 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007); Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 81; see
also ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, supra note 36, at 41.
The IRS has also shown an interest in such policies. As part of the application for taxexempt status, the IRS provides a sample conflict of interest policy and inquires as to
whether the applicant enacted such a policy, though adoption is not required. See I.R.S.
Instructions for Form 1023 (Cat. No. 17132z) app. A (Sample Conflict of Interest Policy)
Its recently issued draft
(2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf.
revised Form 990 similarly asks each filing organization to report whether it has "a written
conflict of interest policy." I.R.S. Draft Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) pt. III question 3a (2007), available at
This interest may well be paying
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/form990coreform.pdf.
dividends, at least in terms of establishment of conflict of interest policies. A 2006 study of
nearly 1000 nonprofits found 78% of nonprofits now had such a policy, up from 67% just
last year. Grant Thornton, The 2006 Grant Thornton LLP National Board Governance
available
at
3
(2006),
Organizations
for
Not-for-Profit
Survey
http://www.grantthomton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/files/Industries/NotForProfit/nfp-board l.p
df, see also Ostrower, supra note 83, at 9 (reporting a lower percentage (half) of nonprofits
that had adopted such a policy); BoardSource, supra note 83, at 8 (reporting a similar rise
over the past decade).
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serious is the possibility that donors will engage in domination. The
financial reliance of nonprofits on their major donors' largesse may
empower these donors to dominate their colleagues on the board. 123 Even
if a donor does not actively try to dominate his colleagues, the influence of
a major donor's position on an issue will be difficult for other directors to
ignore. If a director who is also a nonprofit's major donor refuses to vote to
initiate a new program, it might well pressure her colleagues on the board to
vote against it as well. Thus, domination remains a concern with donordirectors, and casting them as independent in order to serve an antidomination function is somewhat dubious.
Still, donors often are excellent 24 and extremely desirable board
members. What is more, donors are valuable resources and assets to their
nonprofits in ways that go far beyond their financial contributions. 125 They
can have a real dedication to the pursuit of the nonprofit's mission and
programs, at least those to which they feel connected via their donations.
They may have information and expertise in the organization's affairs or
industry, which brought them and their funds to the organization or which
they acquired in order to research their contributions. Thus, like with
volunteers, anyone considering legislating donors out of the category of
independent directors should proceed with caution.
Of course, it bears repeating that designating a class of individuals
ineligible for independent director status does not bar them from nonprofit
governance entirely. A definition of independence that excludes substantial
donors would still allow them to serve, but it could seriously limit their
participation. If combined with an independent majority requirement for
board composition, donor-directors would be eligible to fill fewer than half
of the available board seats. In many boards, some non-independent board
seats will be needed for employees, thereby curtailing further the number of
available directorships for donors. Using a definition of independence that
excluded donors in combination with an audit committee credentialing
requirement also would limit donors' participation in nonprofit governance,
leaving them to staff only those committees other than audit.
Excluding donors from the definition of independent may also raise some
If the theory of
donors' hackles, and not without good reason.
independence is that these directors will be less likely to experience
conflicts of interest, more objective, and less of a domination concern, it is
understandable that the non-independent label may be perceived as less

123. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, supra note 36, at 27
(contemplating just this possibility).
Board
124. See generally Jeffrey L. Callen, April Klein & Daniel Tinkelman,
Composition, Committees, and Organizational Efficiency: The Case of Nonprofits, 32

Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 493 (2003) (reporting evidence consistent with the
proposition that donors on boards engage in monitoring of nonprofit performance and
accountability).
125. See Boozang, supra note 55, at 27 ("Empirical data support the presumption that
donors and corporate leaders benefit nonprofit boards in ways beyond financial.").
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desirable. These important nonprofit actors may understandably chafe at
being excluded from playing some of the most significant roles in an
organization. These fears may ascribe to donors an unrealistic level of
desire to do the difficult work of nonprofit governance, 12 6 but when one is
considering action that may frustrate donors, a light touch is probably
prudent.
Thoughtful legislatures would likely decline to risk upsetting donor bases
and therefore would not exclude donors from the definition of
independence, following the course of those states that adopted the
nonprofit independent director requirements currently in force.127 After all,
major donors' commitment and passion are a large part of what makes them
desirable directors. And, make no mistake, these donors are desirable
directors. Furthermore, boards must be staffed and, in order to function,
they must be kept within some manageable size. 128 Thus, simply increasing
the total number of directorships to deal with donor demand for nonindependent board seats would have adverse side effects. For all of these
reasons, donors should not be categorically removed from the definition of
independence. Still, for the reasons discussed above, permitting substantial
donors to serve as independent directors may limit the ability of
independence requirements to serve the goals that stand behind them.
D. Other FinancialRelationships
Numerous financial relationships can exist between directors and
nonprofits, beyond those created by employment, employment-type roles,
and donations. Students enrolled in a nonprofit university, parents of
children attending a nonprofit private school,' 2 9 subscribers to a theater
company, and owners of local businesses within the orbit of a community
development organization all might frequently have personal interests in the
decisions that are made by their organizations' boards. Of equal or greater
import, there is a class of directors or director candidates whose potential
126. See Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small, Failing to Govern?: The Disconnect
Between Theory and Reality in Nonprofit Boards, and How to Fix It, Stan. Soc. Innovation
Rev., Spring 2005, at 42, 47-48 (suggesting a bifurcated board model in order to deal with
the problem that donors (and some other valuable directors) may not want to engage in
governance, but still want to serve on nonprofit boards); see also Callen et al., supra note
124, at 516 (finding "major donors appear to be underrepresented on monitoring
committees" in their study, but not offering a reason for this state of affairs).
127. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 official cmt. (1987) (clarifying that
the RMNCA's optional independent board composition requirement does not apply to
donors, even ones who "contributed all or substantially all of the assets of a public benefit
corporation and simply serve on its board").
128. See Siegel, supra note 69, § 3.3(a)(iii), at 30 (offering views of the advantages and
disadvantages of large boards); IRS, supra note 25, at 1 (2006) (commenting on the
problems of boards that are too large, particularly that they may be inattentive); Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 77 (reviewing perspectives on appropriate
board size); Boozang, supra note 55, at 24 (reporting the common wisdom that cautions
against large boards and reviewing the evidence addressing this issue).
129. [ thank David Reiss for this example.
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financial relationship with the nonprofit is a major reason for their
desirability on the board, 130 such as the head of a local bank or owner of a
local property the nonprofit seeks to rent. If the idea is to screen from the
independent category all of those individuals who might possibly
experience financial conflicts, clouds on their objectivity, or susceptibility
to dominate or be dominated, the sweep of the non-independent category
would be so broad that board seats would almost certainly go unfilled. A
definition that casts such a wide net is surely unworkable. Rather, the
dangers of influence by these kinds of relationships would likely be dealt
with more profitably by the individualized development and scrupulous
application of a conflict of interest policy specific to each nonprofit or class
of nonprofits.
E. Social Relationships
No currently adopted definition of independence has targeted social
relationships beyond families. While such conflicts may create a lack of
independence in particular circumstances, "[a]llegations of mere personal
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are
13
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director's independence." 1
Still, commentators on the impact of independence requirements have
argued that they would be more effective if they could somehow address
132
directors with social relationships with other directors and management.
The potential for social relationships to impact integrity, objectivity, and
domination is clear. These relationships, though perhaps not as much as
blood ties, can taint directors with conflicts by association. They may be
unwilling or unable to give thorough scrutiny to the conflicts of their close
130. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Peregrine & Broccolo, supra
note 56, at 522-25 (noting that vendor and other financial relationships beyond compensated
employments are ones nonprofits should consider when defining director independence).
131. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1050 (Del. 2004); see also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937-48 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (finding that directors' employment by Stanford University rendered their
independence subject to challenge in the context of serving on a special litigation committee
considering a suit against others with relationships to Stanford as donors and a former
professor).
132. Concern over this so-called "structural bias" problem has persisted for decades. See,
e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundationsand Legal Implications of CorporateCohesion, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83,
85 (1985) (arguing, in a seminal piece, that social psychological mechanisms, including
"prior associations" and "common cultural and social heritages," can create bias among
putatively "independent" directors serving on special litigation committees (SLCs)); Lisa M.
Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal
Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 381, 408-15
(2005) (raising, in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, concerns that social ties and group
dynamics among boards can undermine the ability of directors to perform their roles); Julian
Velasco, StructuralBias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 821 (2004)
(investigating structural bias deeply, and recommending that standards of review be changed
in order to deal with its effects). But see Davis, supra note 75 (offering a recent critique of
the structural bias theory as it relates to SLCs).
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friends, or even of social or business acquaintances that move in the same
circles. 133 Similarly, these directors may be all too willing to defer to the
judgment of their social friends or business acquaintances, thereby failing to
exercise the objective analysis for which independent directors are prized,
allowing themselves to be dominated, or both. 134 This may be due to a
sense of trust or obligation to a friend, or perhaps simply motivated by a
greater concern for maintaining the social relationship outside the
boardroom than protecting the nonprofit's interests within it. Friends,
business associates, or even casual acquaintances who become codirectors
of a nonprofit simply may trust, rely upon, or defer to one another more
than would strangers.
The problems arising from social relationships among directors are easy
to anticipate, but hard to fix. At least two difficulties arise when one tries to
regulate the influence of social relationships on boards through
independence requirements. First, it is extremely difficult to define the
social relationships that should preclude a director's inclusion in the
independent camp. Crafting legislation or regulations, or even best
practices, that turn on words like "friends" or "social relationships" is
asking for terribly difficult line-drawing problems. Draftsmen will be hardpressed to distinguish between those social relationships that compromise
independence and those that can be ignored for purposes of establishing
independent status. Screening out those with social relationships with
existing directors or management may also unreasonably shrink the pool of
available director candidates. Although it is uncertain whether nonprofit
boards are as homogenous as their for-profit counterparts, 135 they certainly
draw new members significantly from the social groups of existing
directors.
Even if these difficult line-drawing and staffing problems could be
solved, and this is a significant assumption, one would still have to deal
with the social relationships among directors that form during their
terms. 136 Relationships may be forged or deepened through the shared
experience of board service. Moreover, even if their members do not
become close social friends, boards still can become subject to
"groupthink" that can blind individual directors to lapses in financial
integrity, shutter them from new ideas, and make them susceptible to

133. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 612 (noting the potential impact of social

relationships on independence); Fairfax, supra note 132, at 408-09 (describing evidence
indicating social ties can undermine board performance); Velasco, supra note 132, at 858-60
(offering an account of structural bias based on social relationships).
134. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 612; Fairfax, supra note 132, at 408-09; Velasco,
supra note 132, at 858-60.
135. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 Or. L. Rev. 435, 500 n.209 (2004) (noting the relatively "narrow elite"
comprising for-profit corporate boards of the largest U.S. companies).
136. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 132, at 409 ("Studies of boardroom behavior and
reports of recent corporate governance scandals also indicate that directors who serve for
long periods of time develop strong social ties that might inhibit their independence.").
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dominating personas. 137 The social dynamic of serving on a board and
pursuing a nonprofit's mission together can lead even formerly complete
strangers to over-trust, over-rely upon, and over-defer to one another.
Therefore, both social relationships that predate board service and those that
develop from it can create obstacles to optimal functioning of
"independent" directors.
Thus, social relationships on nonprofit boards raise serious issues. Due
to the complexity of demarcating social relationships that threaten
independence and the dynamic nature of board service experiences,
however, independence requirements are not suited to remedying them.' 38
F. Commitment to Mission
Of course, in an extreme attempt to achieve objectivity, a definition of
nonprofit director independence could exclude anyone with a commitment
to the mission of the relevant organization. This interpretation is at best
unworkable and at worst absurd. 139 Measuring commitment to mission
would again necessitate extremely arbitrary line drawing.
More
importantly, such an interpretation would leave the ranks of potential
independent directors woefully inadequate. Who would agree to serve in
these voluntary positions without any interest in the organization's mission?
And why would nonprofits want these directors? The objectivity goal of
independent director reforms always trades expertise for objectivity. But
looking to staff the majority of nonprofit boards or their important
committees with directors having no interest in their organizations' goals
would simply be foolhardy.
G. Who Will Remain?
The questions of social relationships and how wide a net an
independence requirement might cast in defining its key terms dovetail with
a final issue worth emphasizing one last time. This is the ever-present
140
If
concern of screening out too many qualified director candidates.
137. See Brudney, supra note 52, at 611-12, 633-34 (pointing out how the pressures of
group dynamics contribute to independent directors' difficulties in policing integrity and
efficiency); Fairfax, supra note 132, at 410-11 (addressing the potentially detrimental
impact of "boardroom norms"); Fanto, supra note 135, at 460-72 (describing the damaging

effect of "groupthink" and other social psychological pressures on the effectiveness of
corporate boards as monitors); Velasco, supra note 132, at 860-65 (reviewing the literature
on structural bias as a result of social psychological phenomena).
138. See Peregrine & Broccolo, supra note 56, at 506-07, 525 (finding that current forprofit law on how social relationships impact independence is not a sufficient basis for
excluding those with social relationships from a definition of nonprofit director
independence, but still advocating consideration of these relationships as a factor).
139. See Boozang, supra note 55, at 20 ("[A] board wholly comprised of objective
monitors in a nonprofit context seems counter-intuitive.").
140. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 official cmt. (1987) (noting this
concern led some drafting committee members to disfavor an independent board
composition requirement); Ostrower, supra note 83, at 23 (reporting a finding that "[s]eventy
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independence requirements are to be enforced, a large class of independent
director candidates needs to exist from which organizations may recruit.
However, independence could be defined so restrictively that the pool of
candidates would be too small to fill all of the necessary positions. A
shortage of director candidates may be especially difficult for nonprofits
for whom
that are small, rural, new, less prominent, or more controversial,
41
the struggle to staff boards can already be challenging.1
Of equal concern is the possibility that defining independence too
restrictively will screen out many potential directors who have other
valuable board qualifications, leaving too few director candidates who are
both independent and otherwise qualified to serve. 142 Depending on how it
is done, screening out those with potential financial interests in the
organization, for example, might exclude those with knowledge of the
relevant industry or with helpful business or other contacts. Attempts to
remove those with social relationships from the independent category may
have a similar effect. In the sense that independence trades off with
expertise and dedication, there is a point at which the cost of pursuing
independence may just be too great.
Thus, defining independence is immensely challenging. Attempts so far
have been limited to issues of direct and consistent financial interest or
familial ties. The foregoing analysis suggests the advantages of thus
limiting the definitional project. Defining independence more broadly
might well require theoretically indefensible line drawing, dilute the
requirements that will be imposed, or both. Furthermore, drafting these
definitions requires care to avoid damaging potential consequences for
board recruitment and the health of the nonprofit sector writ large.
IV.

MAKING NONPROFIT INDEPENDENCE REFORMS OPERATIONAL

Nonprofit independence reforms must be carefully considered and
drafted. This undertaking must grapple with challenging definitional issues
posed by translation of the independence idea for application in the

percent of nonprofits are having difficulty recruiting board members, and 20 percent are
finding it very difficult"); Szymanski, supra note 46, at 1316-17 (noting the problems
nonprofits are encountering in recruiting directors); see also Rodrigues, supra note 49, at 17
(noting the similar problem faced in for-profits, dealing with their own shortage of director
candidates).

141. See, e.g., Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Final Report, supra note 29, at 78 (noting
the "particular problem" faced by nonprofits seeking board members in "smaller
communities and rural areas"); Szymanski, supra note 46, at 1316-17 (noting the especially
difficult director recruitment efforts for small nonprofits).
142. See Mulligan, supra note 48, at 2009 (commenting on the potential difficulty of
finding nonprofit directors with needed expertise); Szymanski, supra note 46, at 1316
(noting reports that nonprofits have difficulty finding "qualified" candidates for board seats);
see also Aprill, supra note 36, at 773 (noting that some research suggests reform "efforts
should concentrate not on independence of the full [audit] committee but on ensuring
expertise").
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nonprofit sector. It also must be considered within the broader context of
improving nonprofit governance and strengthening the nonprofit sector.
If reformers are intent on creating boards composed of majorities or
supermajorities of independent directors and requiring independent
credentials of most or all audit committee members, such requirements
must rely on a narrow definition of independence. Such a practical
definition would exclude only compensated employees and others with
consistent financial conflicts. At least outside of private foundations,
family members of management, directors, and employees would also be
excluded. This course minimizes the risk of undermining other important
goals for the nonprofit sector, potentially alienating important nonprofit
constituencies such as donors and volunteers, and impoverishing the ranks
of qualified candidates. Thus, it is no surprise that employment and family
relationships surface in nearly every existing and proposed definition of
nonprofit director independence. Of course, with this restricted definition,
one can expect only limited results on the issues independence reforms are
designed to target. With a definition removing only those with the most
obvious ties, such a reform can make only partial gains in avoiding integrity
breaches, encouraging objectivity, and combating domination.
The extent to which independence requirements based on such a narrow
definition will change current boards' composition and audit committee
credentials is also unclear. It seems a sensible operational principle that
nonprofit boards and audit committees should not be composed primarily or
entirely of employees and family members. But empirical study would be
required to determine whether this state of affairs truly exists to any
substantial degree in the nonprofit sector. This problem is admittedly quite
serious where it exists, but it is simply unknown whether majority
employee or family boards are common. Without some sense of the scope
of these practices, it is hard to recommend a legislative or regulatory
mandate prohibiting them. It might seem of little harm to enact legislation
mandating the status quo for most nonprofits and outlawing a major
governance problem in the few with such clearly interested board or audit
committee majorities. Yet, in the context of limited legislative and
regulatory resources and energy, such legislation may not be wise if
majority employee or family boards or audit committees are not
widespread. Even expending the likewise limited capital of self-regulatory
recommendation processes on a problem that rarely occurs is difficult to
defend.
It is possible, of course, to cast a wider definitional net, focusing on
relationships beyond financial and family ones. Due to concerns about
avoiding insult to important nonprofit constituencies and maintaining a pool
of willing and qualified director candidates, however, broadening the
definition will necessitate reducing the extent of independence required
among directors and audit committee members. The Senate Finance
Committee Staff Discussion Draft made just this compromise. Its vaguer
and potentially broader definition would exclude anyone with "any
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relationship with the corporation or its management that may impair or
1 43
appear to impair the director's ability to make independent judgments."'
Perhaps because of this, however, the draft's independence reforms would
require a much lower percentage of the board to qualify as "independent"only twenty percent or a minimum of one director. 144 This solution
removes a bit of the flash of independence requirements, but perhaps this is
appropriate. It signals what may simply be the disappointing truth; once
operationalized, one should not expect too much change from nonprofit
independence reforms.
One way to shore up the gains to be made from independence
requirements, whether these mandates are based on narrow or broad
definitions of independence, is to supplement them with other approaches to
nonprofit governance reform. 145 Board and committee members may
respond well to education and guidelines that address how to deal with the
relationships of influence that will always exist (to some degree) among
their ranks. Crafting and actively using conflict of interest policies can
assist them in tracking and managing financial relationships. Training on
their fiduciary duties and on group decision making can help them to
consider when their own objectivity or that of their colleagues may be
clouded, and can alert them to the dangers of domination. The same issues
independence requirements would address by fiat can be thereby addressed
by encouraging board practices that attune directors of all backgrounds to
the need for balance and a reliance on process. These reform avenues can
make great strides in solving the real problems of integrity, efficiency, and
domination that exist in the nonprofit sphere. They will likely do more than
will formal independence requirements-certainly, they will do more as a
complement to these requirements than these mandates would do on their
own.
CONCLUSION

Director independence is an idea with many threads and not all of them
are easily translated from their for-profit origins to the nonprofit context.
Therefore, in considering adaptation of director independence reforms to
the nonprofit sector, it is important to take into consideration the differing
needs of nonprofits and their boards. When such a careful analysis is
undertaken, it reveals the relatively limited contribution director
independence reforms can make in addressing the real accountability

143. Staff ofS. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., supra note 16, at 13.
144. See id. Additionally, the draft's reforms focus only on board composition, not audit
committee credentials. See id. at 12-13 (envisioning that the entire board would undertake

audit oversight rather than a smaller committee).
145. Other commentators have also offered excellent proposals for governance reforms as
a complement or substitute for independence requirements. See Aprill, supra note 36, at
792-94 (offering proposals for federal incentives for nonprofit board education and
establishing minimum standards for nonprofit governance); Boozang, supra note 55, at 4248 (advocating changes in board structure and transparency).
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challenges faced by nonprofits. Therefore, pursuit of independence reforms
should not distract legislators, regulators, and self-regulatory bodies from
the importance of focusing energy and resources on education and training
for all nonprofit fiduciaries.

